

Continuous higher randomness

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Higher randomness and
continuity

Long computations

Let $\langle L_e \rangle_{e < \omega}$ be an effective list of all computable linear orderings.
Recall that

$$\text{CWO} = \{e < \omega : L_e \text{ is a well-ordering} \}$$

is Π_1^1 -complete. That is, a set $A \subseteq \omega$ is Π_1^1 if and only if it is m -reducible to CWO.

Informally, this shows that Π_1^1 sets are in some sense “generalised c.e.”. If A is Π_1^1 and f is an m -reduction of A to CWO, then we say that $n \in A$ is enumerated into A at stage $\text{otp}(f(n))$.

Long computations

For example, consider the reduction property. If A, B are c.e., and $A \cup B = \omega$, then there are c.e. $\hat{A} \subseteq A$ and $\hat{B} \subseteq B$ which partition ω : for each $n < \omega$, put n into \hat{A} if n enters A before it (perhaps) enters B .

Similarly, suppose that A, B are Π_1^1 , and $A \cup B = \omega$; let f, g be m -reductions of A, B to CWO. Let $\hat{A} = \{n \in A : \text{otp}(f(n)) \leq \text{otp}(g(n))\}$ and $\hat{B} = \{n \in B : \text{otp}(g(n)) < \text{otp}(f(n))\}$ (with the obvious interpretation of \leq for ill-founded order-types).

Formalising the intuition

This intuition can be formalised using a set theoretic understanding of computability. Recall that a set $A \subseteq \omega$ is c.e. if and only if it is Σ_1 -definable (with parameters) in the structure (H_ω, ϵ) .

What makes the basic theorems of computability work is that H_ω is **admissible**: the image of every finite set by a computable function is bounded below ω .

The structure $L_{\omega_1^{\text{ck}}}$ is admissible as well (this follows from Spector's Σ_1^1 bounding principle). Call a subset of $L_{\omega_1^{\text{ck}}}$ **c.e.** if it is Σ_1 -definable in that structure (with parameters). A set $A \subseteq \omega$ is **c.e.** if and only if it is Π_1^1 .

Higher randomness

Computable enumerability is the most basic concept in recursion theory; everything else can be derived from it. For example, a set is **computable** if it is **c.e.** and **co-c.e.**

Similarly, a set $\mathcal{U} \subseteq 2^\omega$ is **effectively** open if it is generated by a **c.e.** set of strings.

Definition (Hjorth, Nies)

A **ML** test is a sequence $\langle \mathcal{U}_n \rangle$ of uniformly **effectively** open sets with $\lambda(\mathcal{U}_n) \leq 2^{-n}$. The test captures $\bigcap_n \mathcal{U}_n$. **MLR** is the set of reals not captured by any **ML** test.

Higher randomness

Theorem (Schnorr,Levin;Hjorth,Nies)

The following are equivalent for $X \in 2^\omega$:

1. $X \in \text{MLR}$.
2. $K(X \upharpoonright_n) \geq^+ n$.

Some work is needed because it is not the case that every **effectively** open set is generated by a **c.e.** antichain. Some approximation is required.

Randomness and computability

For a Turing operator Φ and a string σ , let

$$\Phi^{-1}[\sigma] = \{Y \in 2^\omega : \Phi(Y) \supseteq \sigma\}.$$

(This may contain reals on which Φ is not total).

Theorem (Levin,Zvonkin;Miller,Yu)

The following are equivalent for $X \in 2^\omega$:

1. $X \in \text{MLR}$.
2. For any Turing operator Φ , $\lambda(\Phi^{-1}[X \upharpoonright_n]) \leq^x 2^{-n}$.
3. For every A and Φ , if $\Phi(A) = X$ then the use $\varphi(A, n) \geq^+ n$.

(2) is the continuous analogue of the discrete measure (prefix-free complexity) characterisation of randomness, and is essentially the same as the supermartingale characterisation of randomness.

Randomness and computability

The same holds for **MLR**, but we need to identify what operators we use. A **Turing** operator is a **c.e.** set of pairs (σ, τ) (the pair says that with an oracle extending σ outputs τ). We write $A \leq_T B$ if there is a **Turing** functional Φ such that $\Phi(B) = A$.

However, note that $\lambda(\Phi^{-1}[\sigma])$ is a supermartingale if Φ is **consistent**. In countable world this is not an issue. In the higher setting, it is.

Interlude: think why we can't always get consistency.

On consistency

Why would we consider inconsistent functionals?

First reason: “philosophical”. **Computable**^B should mean **c.e.**^B and **co-c.e.**^B

If we require continuity, there is only one way to define **c.e.**^B:

Definition

A **c.e. operator** is a **c.e.** set of pairs $(\sigma, x) \in 2^{<\omega} \times \omega$. For $B \in 2^\omega$ and a **c.e. operator** Φ , we let

$$\Phi(B) = \{x : \exists \sigma < B. (\sigma, x) \in \Phi\}.$$

Sets of this form are called **B-c.e.**

More on consistency

Second reason: practical. Consider for example:

Theorem (Hirschfeldt, Miller)

If $X \in \text{MLR} \setminus \text{W2R}$ then there is some noncomputable c.e. set $A \leq_T X$.

The proof does not give a consistent functional. Or:

Theorem (Franklin, Ng; Yu)

The following are equivalent for $X \in \text{MLR}$:

- X fails a *difference* test: there is a sequence $\langle \mathcal{U}_n \rangle$ of uniformly *effectively* open sets and an *effectively* closed set \mathcal{P} such that $\lambda(\mathcal{P} \cap \mathcal{U}_n) \leq 2^{-n}$ and $X \in \mathcal{P} \cap \bigcap_n \mathcal{U}_n$.
- $X \geq_T 0$.

(some more work is needed).

Randomness and continuity

Theorem (van Lambalgen)

$A \oplus B \in \text{MLR}$ if and only if $A \in \text{MLR}$ and $B \in \text{MLR}^A$.

A corollary of Levin-Zvonkin:

Theorem (Miller, Yu)

Suppose that \mathcal{C} is a test-based, reasonable randomness notion stronger than MLR. Then \mathcal{C} is downward-closed in the \leq_T -degrees of MLR.

(inconsistency must be dealt with).

Stronger notions of randomness

We mentioned in passing **weak 2** randomness.

Theorem (Yu,Chong)

A left-c.e. random real is not **weak 2** random.

They used the Lebesgue density theorem.

Simple proof.

Let $A = A_{\omega_1^{\text{ck}}} = \lim_{s < \omega_1^{\text{ck}}} A_s$, a monotone approximation. The set

$$\mathcal{D} = \{A_s : s \leq \omega_1^{\text{ck}}\}$$

is closed. Let

$$\mathcal{U}_n = \bigcup_{s < \omega_1^{\text{ck}}} [A_s \upharpoonright_n].$$

Then $\bigcap_n \mathcal{U}_n = \mathcal{D}$. It is countable, and so null. □

Corollary

Every **weak 2** random real is **difference** random.



The converse of Hirschfeldt-Miller is not known.

Theorem (folklore?)

A real X is weak 2 random if and only if it is not captured by a test $\langle \mathcal{U}_n \rangle$ with $\lambda(\mathcal{U}_n) \leq 2^{-n}$ and $\mathcal{U}_n = [W_{f(n)}]$ for some $f \leq_T \emptyset'$.

That is, $W2R = \text{MLR}\langle \emptyset' \rangle$. The higher analogue fails, because there is an O -computable $X \in \text{W2R}$ (Kleene basis theorem). Again, think of the time trick required.

A new characterisation of W2R

Theorem

The following are equivalent for $X \in \text{MLR}$:

- ▶ $X \notin \text{MLR}\langle O \rangle$.
- ▶ X is captured by a 'long test': a test $\langle \mathcal{U}_\alpha : \alpha < \omega_1^{\text{ck}} \rangle$, uniformly c.e., with null intersection.
- ▶ X computes a noncomputable c.e. subset of ω_1^{ck} .
- ▶ There is some O -computable non-c.e. set $A \subseteq \omega$ which is c.e. ^{X}

Π_1^1 randomness

Theorem (Kechris)

There is a greatest null Π_1^1 set.

Its complement is the collection of Π_1^1 -random reals. Since Π_1^1 is closed under number quantification, Π_1^1 randomness implies weak 2 randomness. Again because of the basis theorem, it does not imply $\text{MLR}\langle O \rangle$.

Question (Nies, Yu)

- ▶ Is $\Pi_1^1\text{-R} = \text{W2R}$?
- ▶ What is the Borel rank of $\Pi_1^1\text{-R}$?

Remark (Chong, Nies, Yu)

For $X \in \text{MLR}$, $X \in \Pi_1^1\text{-R}$ if and only if $\omega_1^X = \omega_1^{\text{ck}}$.

Steel showed that the Borel rank of reals which preserve ω_1^{ck} is $\omega_1^{\text{ck}} + 2$.

The Borel rank of Π_1^1 -R

Theorem

Π_1^1 -R is Σ_3^0 (and not Σ_3^0).

Why? Regularity behaves:

Lemma

Let \mathcal{G} be Π_1^1 . For every $\epsilon > 0$ there is an *effectively* closed set $\mathcal{P} \subseteq \mathcal{G}$ with $\lambda(\mathcal{G} - \mathcal{P}) < \epsilon$.

Lemma

Let $X \in \text{MLR}$. Then $X \in \Pi_1^1$ -R if and only if for any *effectively* G_δ set \mathcal{G} there is some *effectively* closed $\mathcal{P} \subseteq \mathcal{G}$ of positive measure containing X .

A new inclusion

In fact, O can tell if an **effectively** closed set is null, and if it is contained in a given **effectively** G_δ set. Hence:

Theorem

MLR $\langle O \rangle \subset \Pi_1^1\text{-R}$.

We still do not know if $\Pi_1^1\text{-R} = \mathbf{W2R}$. A positive answer will be a strong converse to Hirschfeldt-Miller.

Lowness for randomness

K-triviality

Hjorth and Nies constructed noncomputable, K -trivial sets, but showed that lowness for Π_1^1 -MLR and lowness for K are identical with being computable.

However, they did not use continuous relativisation.

Theorem

The following are equivalent for $A \in 2^\omega$:

1. *A is K -trivial.*
2. *A is low for K (but we need to say what this means!)*
3. *A is low for MLR.*
4. *A is a base for MLR.*

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